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ABSTRACT This article offers a sociological perspective on the rise of and crackdown
on the falun gong in relation to the social, cultural and political context of China. I
specify from a sociological perspective that the falun gong is categorically not a sect
but a cult-like new religious movement. Its popularity, I suggest, is related to the
unresolved secular problems, normative breakdown and ideological vacuum in China
in the 1980s and 1990s. Before the crackdown, the falun gong represented a
successful new religious movement, from a Euro-American perspective. However,
most of its strengths as a movement have become adversarial to its survival in the
specific historical and political condition of China.
The phenomenal growth and overseas expansion of the falun gong (FLG;
also known as the falun dafa) surprised the Chinese leadership. On the
other hand, the heavy-handed crackdown launched by the Chinese
government on this group startled world-wide observers. This article
attempts to understand the rise and fall of the FLG from a sociological
perspective. Applying theoretical insights from the sociology of new
religious movements (NRM), it explores how the contemporary socio-
cultural context of China contributed to the popularity of religious and
quasi-religious qigong movements like the FLG and why the Chinese
government launched a severe crackdown on this particular group.
In the late 1980s there were already many religious and quasi-religious
qigong groups in mainland China.1 A sociological analysis of the popular-
ity of the FLG will contribute to an understanding of the “qigong fever”
phenomenon in China. The FLG was founded by a 47-year-old Chinese
man, Li Hongzhi, in Changchun in 1992 and spread rapidly first in
north-eastern China and soon across the whole country. The number of
FLG practitioners multiplied and reached millions within seven years.
Between late 1998 and early 1999, the group reached its peak, with
thousands of practice sites (liangong dian) scattered all over public parks
in China. In the late 1990s, it expanded globally and had “main stations”
(zongzhan) in numerous developed and developing countries.
David Ownby notes that anti-qigong voices were heard in China as
early as the late 1980s. Criticism was centred on the pseudo-scientific
* Thanks to Hoiman Chan, Gary Fine, Wendy Griswold, Bobai Li, Stephen Warner and
Dingxin Zhao for useful comments on earlier versions of this article.
1. Sima Nan, an anti-quasi-religious qigong critic in China, said that the FLG was not
the largest qigong group. He listed several others such as zhong gong, yuan ji gong and wang
gong, all of which were said to be larger than the FLG in terms of its membership, though
no proof was given. See “A star turn for China’s cult buster,” The New York Times, 22
November 1999.
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claims made by the qigong masters.2 Nevertheless, the Chinese authori-
ties did not take any serious action against qigong groups before the
mid-1990s.3 In fact, the FLG was once recognized by the Chinese
authorities as contributing to the improvement of the health of thousands
of middle-aged and older citizens.4 To the surprise of FLG practitioners
and observers within and outside China, the Chinese government out-
lawed the group on 22 July 1999 and rounded up more than 5,000
followers within a week. The mass sit-in held by FLG followers outside
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders’ residence in Zhongnanhai,
Beijing, on 25 April 1999 seems to be the incident that was the immediate
cause of the suppression. Some scholars suggest that the provocative
behaviour of the charismatic leader and his followers led the Chinese
authorities to believe that the FLG could threaten social stability and
challenge their rule.5 Nevertheless, the collective actions taken by FLG
followers were all sit-in petitions in a well-disciplined and rule-observing
manner. They can hardly be described as provocative in themselves.
Why, then, did the Chinese authorities launch such a heavy-handed
crackdown against the group?
This article addresses three issues of the FLG. In view of the popular
labelling of the group as a sect and a cult, it first delineates its sociolog-
ical nature based on the NRM literature. I suggest that the FLG can be
understood as a NRM with characteristics comparable to those in Euro-
American contexts in the 1950s to 1970s. It is less a sectarian than a
cult-like NRM. It emerged as a response to the unresolved secular
problems and normative breakdown brought about by the dramatic
economic reforms and the ideological vacuum left by the decline of the
communist ideology. The popular accounts of the crackdown on the FLG
are often one-sided, attributing the problem either to the behaviour of the
group or to an internal crisis within the CCP. I argue that neither of these
can be a sufficient factor. Instead, it is the interaction among the political
implication of Chinese history of NRMs, the social canon of social
stability since 1989, the organizational nature and mobilization power of
the FLG, the strong ideological commitment of FLG followers and the
2. David Ownby, “ ‘Heterodoxy’ in late socialist China: the Chinese state’s case against
Falungong,” paper presented at the East Asian Workshop at University of Chicago, 27 March
2001, pp. 11–12.
3. The regime’s first campaign against some qigong practices came in February 1996
when a qigong organization called Shen Chang Center for Human Body Applied Science and
Technology in Suzhou was fined 8 million RMB. The use of qigong for healing was prohibited
but there was no severe national crackdown on a particular qigong group before the one on
the FLG. See James Tong, “An organizational analysis of the falun gong: structure,
communications, financing,” The China Quarterly, No. 171 (September 2002), p. 640.
4. For example, Li Hongzhi was honoured with “The award for advancing boundary
science” by the Committee of Specialists of the Oriental Health Expo in China in 1993,
according to a FLG website called Minghui Net (Clear Wisdom Net) at www.clearwisdom.ca.
See also Zhang Weiqing and Qiao Gong, Li Hongzhi pingchuan: falun gong chuangshiren
(Comments on and the Biography of Li Hongzhi: The Founder of Falun Gong) (Hong Kong:
Mirror Books, 1999).
5. See, for example, John Wong, “The mystery of Falun Gong: its rise and fall in China,”
EAI Background Brief, No. 39 (Singapore: East Asian Institute National University of
Singapore, 1999).
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overseas support of the FLG leader that led to the strong-handed crack-
down against the group. Borrowing sociologist Rodney Stark’s “model of
success” for NRMs, I find that two of the criteria for success in the
American context, namely effective mobilization and internal network,
ironically put the FLG at stake in the Chinese historical and political
context.
Methods and Data
This article relies mainly on four sources of information: my year-long
ethnographic research on the FLG in Chicago and Hong Kong from June
1999 to July 2000; FLG publications such as books, audio and video
tapes, and articles from FLG official and associated websites; Chinese
government official propaganda materials such as video tapes, books and
the press; and media reports in the United States and Hong Kong.
I began my ethnographic study of the FLG in Chicago in June 1999 by
being a practitioner.6 I joined different kinds of FLG practices, gatherings
and activities in Chicago on a regular basis for six months from August
1999 to January 2000. From February to July 2000, my participation was
more focused and selective. I participated less in their regular weekly
practices but more in their monthly events and special activities.7 My
research in Hong Kong was divided into two periods. The first lasted for
three weeks from the middle of July to early August 1999, during which
I conducted intensive participant observation and joined FLG activities
almost every day.8 I kept in regular contact with some followers in Hong
6. My role as a researcher was made clear to the key informants. The attitude of the
followers in Chicago toward my research was open and helpful. They treated me as an ordinary
follower, which was what I attempted to maintain as my participant identity. Patricia and Peter
Adler have discussed in detail the advantages and drawbacks of various kinds of membership
roles in ethnographic research. My role in the FLG lies in between a periphery and an active
membership. My moderately active membership role enabled me to experience the
subjectivities of the group yet maintain a distance at times for objective analysis. It also
allowed me to collect data in a relatively natural environment and get access to some
information that cannot be obtained from formal interviews. Nevertheless, the significant
drawbacks of an active membership are role conflict and the feeling of betraying the
informants. During the second half of my research period, my role was more a periphery one.
The periphery role permitted me to maintain a more objective analysis and minimized the role
conflict. See Patricia and Peter Adler, Membership Roles in Field Research (CA: Sage
Publications, 1987).
7. My selective participation was a deliberate move for two reasons. First, the FLG
followers had increasingly identified me as one of them and asked me to help to set up a
practice site at my school, Northwestern University. My decreasing participation in the regular
practices helped to clarify my role as a researcher, apart from being a FLG practitioner.
Secondly, the regular practices of the FLG, which include a set of qigong exercise, standing
and sitting mediations, and reading the Zhuan falun, are rather standardized. Prolonged
observation of these practices seemed unnecessary. Most dynamic interactions and discourses
among the followers took place during the relatively large-scale monthly events or special
gatherings like protests, promoting the FLG and partying.
8. Some followers in Hong Kong welcomed my research on them whereas some others
were sceptical. I dealt with the scepticism by assuring them of the research ethics of
confidentiality and anonymity and explaining to them what a sociological perspective is.
However, one of the core followers commented that the FLG was too sacred to be analysed
from an academic perspective which he worried would distort the “true nature” of the FLG.
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Kong through electronic mail when I was in Chicago. In December 1999,
I visited Hong Kong again and conducted another three-week intensive
research on the group.
Informal interviews through casual conversations were done during
participant observation. In addition, I conducted 29 face-to-face inter-
views that lasted from one-and-a-half to three hours. Ten were done in
Hong Kong and 19 in Chicago. Twelve of the interviewees are “core
followers,” ten are “ordinary followers” and seven are “peripheral practi-
tioners” (see the next section for the distinctions of these membership
categories). There are 16 females and 13 males, with ages ranging from
23 to 69.
I was not able to conduct field research in China during my research
period, but I interviewed a number of Chinese followers who had
immigrated to or visited Chicago or Hong Kong after the crackdown.
Eleven interviewees were either new immigrants or visitors in Chicago or
Hong Kong, and were the key informants for my data of the FLG in
China. This method of extrapolating from relevant information collected
outside China to China was used by anthropologists when they had no
access to mainland China in the early decades of communist rule.9 Two
acknowledged limitations of this method are, first, the incomplete repre-
sentativeness of the interviewees and, secondly, the contextual problem
of my observation. The interviewees in Chicago and Hong Kong are
likely to be different from the ordinary FLG practitioners in mainland
China. For example, they are usually better educated and economically
better off than the majority of the practitioners in China. The societal
contexts of Chicago and Hong Kong are undeniably different from that of
China. The measures I took to minimize the problems include: asking the
interviewees to describe what happened to their fellow practitioners in
their practice sites apart from narrating their own experiences; interview-
ing a few non-FLG Chinese in Chicago who had witnessed the FLG
phenomenon and the crackdown in China; and cross-checking my ethno-
graphic data with writings from followers in mainland China and infor-
mation from the media. Thus, my analysis attempts to arrive at a plausible
sociological explanation of the FLG phenomenon and the crackdown
based on the available data, rather than claiming a perfect representation
of the FLG and the responses of the CCP.
footnote continued
This is understandable and happens quite often to ethnographic research on religious groups
when the researchers do not adopt a “pro-religion” bias. See Thomas Robbins’ discussion of
the ethical dilemma the sociologists of religion face between sympathy and objectivity in
studying religions in Cult, Converts and Charisma: The Sociology of New Religious
Movement (London: Sage Publications, 1988), pp. 199–204.
9. Hong Kong and Taiwan were commonly the locations for research and findings were
projected to mainland China with caution. See, for example, Jack Potter, Capitalism and the
Chinese Peasant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968) and Hugh Baker, A Chinese
Lineage Village: Sheung Shui (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).
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The Falun Gong as a New Religious Movement
Definitions of new religious movement, sect and cult. Despite the
diversity of the NRMs in Euro-American societies, a few common
characteristics can be identified. A NRM is usually led by a charismatic
leader who is accepted by her or his followers as having final authority
in both spiritual and material matters. She or he is regarded as a
representative of some sacred power and is obeyed accordingly.10 The
usual form of organization tends to be a conjoining of modern, rational
methods with inspirational and charismatic content.11 According to Eileen
Barker, most NRMs have different “layers” of membership, ranging from
full-time and committed members, to active followers, to marginal partic-
ipants.12 The sacred beliefs and practices of the NRMs are eclectic and
mostly inward-oriented. Members are enthusiastically and passionately
involved. Meditation is common, and cure of personal ills, resolution of
problems and improvement in mental and psychological well-being are
commonly reported from the practitioners.13
Most of the NRMs in Euro-American contexts belong to the category
of sect or cult. Sociologically, these are distinguishable in terms of their
belief content, organizational structure and relation to society. While the
term “cult” in popular usage bears some derogatory connotations, the
nature of a cult is less anti-social and exclusive than that of a sect.14 A
sect normally has a prior theological tie with another religious organiza-
tion, mainly the Judeo-Christian church in the Western context.15 Its
organizational characteristics include exclusive membership, communal
and cohesive structure, high demands on members’ spiritual perfection
and expulsion of those who do not follow the moral precepts. The
demanding spiritual and organizational characteristics of a sect tend to
steer it away from secular society, often making it appear hostile or
indifferent.16 A cult, on the other hand, does not have a prior theological
10. John Saliba, Understanding New Religious Movements (Michigan: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1995), pp. 12–13.
11. Bryan Wilson, “Factors in the failure of the new religious movements,” in David
Bromley and Phillip Hammond (eds.), The Future of New Religious Movements (Georgia:
Mercer University Press, 1987), p. 36.
12. Eileen Barker, New Religious Movements: A Practical Introduction (London: HM
Stationery Office, 1989), pp. 11–15.
13. Saliba, Understanding New Religious Movements, pp.18–20.
14. After the massive suicides and five murders committed by People’s Temple in Guyana
in the United States in November 1978, the term “cult” has become associated not only with
danger to the followers but also physical threats to society at large. The anti-cult movement
has intensified since then. See Eileen Barker, “Religious movements: cult and anticult since
Jonestown,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 12 (1986), pp. 329–346.
15. Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge, “Of churches, sects, and cults: preliminary
concepts for a theory of religious movements,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,
Vol. 18, No. 2 (1979), pp. 117–133.
16. Ibid.; see also Bryan Wilson, “An analysis of sect development,” American
Sociological Review, (February 1959), pp. 3–15; Colin Campbell, “The cult, cultic milieu and
secularization,” A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, Vol. 5 (1972), pp. 119–136;
Roy Wallis, “Scientology: therapeutic cult to religious sect,” Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1975),
pp. 89–100.
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tie with an established religious body.17 Its beliefs and practice are very
often mystically and individualistically oriented.18 Cults are usually
loosely structured with a fluctuating membership and tolerant of other
organizations and faiths.19 However, as their belief content is predomi-
nantly based on Asian religions or philosophies such as Buddhism,
Hinduism and lesser-known Indian beliefs, they are perceived as deviant
and anti-social in rationalized Western contexts.
In the case of the FLG, the Chinese authorities define it as an “evil
religion” (xiejiao).20 The press in Hong Kong and the United States
describe it as a “sect” or occasionally a “cult.”21 On the other hand, the
leader of the FLG and his followers reiterate that the FLG is neither a
religion nor an organization. So, what is the nature of the FLG from a
sociological perspective?
The characteristics of the FLG. The founder of the FLG, Li Hongzhi,
claims to be a saviour whose mission is the same as that of Jesus and
Buddha. Li implies his supernatural power in the Zhuan falun. Accord-
ingly, he would install “a complete system of cultivation practice” in
followers’ bodies in order to bring them to “higher levels.”22 FLG
followers believe that Li has supernatural qualities. Miracle stories of
how Li transcends the ordinary world by curing non-curable diseases and
saving followers from dangerous situations have been narrated and
circulated repeatedly among his followers.23 The portrayed characteristics
of Li Hongzhi resemble other charismatic leaders of the NRMs.
The belief system and spiritual practices of the FLG are an eclectic
mixture of Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism and the qigong tradition.
Human life is believed to be created in the space of the universe, not in
ordinary human society. A higher order of reality, invisible and beyond
the reach of secular science, is believed to exist in the universe. The
Zhuan falun, which was produced by Li’s early followers from the
transcription of his lectures in China, is regarded as a sacred text, a
revelation of the Truth of the universe, the Truth being truthfulness–
benevolence–forbearance (zhen–shan–ren).
17. Stark and Bainbridge, “Of churches, sects, and cults,” p. 125.
18. James Richardson, “An oppositional and general conceptualization of cult,” The
Annual Review of the Social Science of Religion, Vol. 2 (1978), pp. 29–51.
19. Campbell, “The cult,” p. 121; Wallis, “Scientology,” p. 91.
20. The translation of “xiejiao” can be “evil religion” or “evil teaching.” However, the
Chinese authorities use the word “cult” as an English translation of “xiejiao.” Translating
“xiejiao” into “cult” is inappropriate and unsupported by empirical facts. Literally, the word
“cult” is not associated with any meanings of “evilness” in either Longman or Oxford
English–Chinese Dictionaries.
21. Just to cite a few examples from The New York Times in the United States and South
China Morning Post in Hong Kong: “The sect that became an enemy of the state,” The New
York Times, 25 July 1999, “Dozens more from sect arrested in Beijing,” The New York Times,
30 October 1999, “20 sect followers arrested,” South China Morning Post, 22 September
1999, and “Tiananmen police grab sect suspects,” South China Morning Post, 30 September
1999.
22. Zhuan falun, pp. 1–7.
23. From my ethnographic observation.
671The Falun Gong in China
Followers believe that the FLG provides a path to salvation through
elevating their moral quality or mind nature (xinxing), which is done by
accumulating virtue (ji de) and eliminating bad karma (xiao ye). Practi-
cally, acting morally and bearing suffering accumulate virtues and elimin-
ate bad karma at the same time. Modifying the Buddhist idea, the Zhuan
falun states that illnesses and tribulations are repaying the debt of bad
karma and, therefore, have a positive function. Medical treatment would
only hamper one’s path to enlightenment:
Nobody can casually change it (ye). Changing it will mean that one does not have to
repay the debt after being in debt…. Some people think that treating patients, healing
their illnesses, as well as keep them fit are good deeds. In my opinion, they have not
really cured the illnesses. They have postponed or transformed them instead of
removing them.24
Most of the core followers I interviewed reported their resistance to seek
medical treatment when they were ill. For example, a young female
follower in Hong Kong once suffered from a hurtful abdominal pain but
refused to seek any medical treatment. She believed that the pain was a
blessing bestowed by Master Li to remove part of her bad karma.25
FLG practitioners range in age from 20 to over 70 years old, with
middle-aged and elderly people in the majority. About 60 per cent of
them are women.26 Young educated followers such as professors and
graduate students are also found. Although the FLG does use the internet
to circulate news and activities, the recruitment of new practitioners in
China is mainly by word-of-mouth through family members, relatives,
colleagues and friends.27
The membership of the FLG can be broadly divided into three cate-
gories based on the degree of commitment to the group. The core layer
is composed of those who totally believe in the charismatic leader, his
supernatural power and worldview, who read the Zhuan falun and
24. It is quoted from the English version of the Zhuan falun, p.3. To keep its originality,
I have not attempted to correct any of the grammatical errors in this and the other quotations
from the book.
25. The follower told me this incident in an interview. Another follower told me that she
refused to go to hospital after she was hit by an car when crossing the road. She had the same
interpretation that her suffering was indeed a blessing.
26. Zong Hairen, “Handling the falungong case,” Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 35
No. 1 (January-February 2002), p. 64. This article is a chapter of a book called Zhu Rongji
1999, published in English in January 2001 and in Chinese in April 2001. Zong Hairen is the
pseudonym of the author or a group of authors. According to the editorial note of Chinese
Law and Government, Zhu Rongji 1999 was published with a similar aim to The Tiananmen
Papers, mainly to provide the outside world with first-hand information of the internal
dynamics of the CCP leadership and to discredit the General Secretary of the CCP, Jiang
Zemin. It is believed to be a product of a person or persons with high-level access in
Zhongnanhai, who belong to the reformist wing of the Party. See Andrew Nathan, “Guest
editor’s introduction,” in the same issue of Chinese Law and Government, pp. 3–13. Despite
its politically-biased objective, Zong’s article seems to base on considerable factual
information. Occasionally, the author raises some evaluative questions and presents
judgmental statements about Jiang Zemin. In citing this article, I have been cautious not to
refer to the judgmental statements but only to some figures and verbatim data.
27. According to three FLG followers who left Beijing for Chicago or Hong Kong after
the crackdown and two non-FLG informants who came from Beijing.
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practise the qigong exercises almost every day. The ultimate concern of
these core followers is to improve their moral quality or mind nature so that
they can transcend the secular world to arrive at the “higher levels.” At the
other extreme is a peripheral layer. Strictly speaking, people in this layer
are only practitioners, not followers. I call them peripheral practitioners.
They do not care too much about the belief or the philosophy of the FLG
but regard it as one of the many qigong practices and are attracted to it
because it is simple and free of charge. An intermediate stratum between
the core and the periphery is comprised of those who are committed to the
FLG to a certain degree: ordinary followers. They practise the FLG for
both physical and moral improvement, read the Zhuan falun on a regular
basis but occasionally raise doubts about Li’s worldview and the possibility
of salvation.28 These layered degrees of commitment agree with Eileen
Barker’s description of the membership characteristics of NRMs.
In terms of organization, there are two opposing versions. The Chinese
government claims that the FLG was a tightly organized, hierarchically
structured organization. The FLG, on the other hand, says that it was not
an organization as it had no physical establishment, no staff and no
administrative structure.29 These two versions were both true to some
extent at different times. As James Tong documents, the FLG made an
organizational switch from more to less structured in early 1997. With the
official campaign against the use of qigong for healing and the failure of
the FLG’s attempt to obtain legal status in 1996, it abolished some of its
organizational infrastructure in 1997. For instance, it disconnected tele-
phones, abrogated the position of liaison officer, terminated its functional
offices of translation, and discontinued services of purchasing FLG
publications for practitioners.30
Nevertheless, the FLG was not without any organization after 1997. It
was composed of a vertical point-to-point connection and two horizontal
networks. The former refers to the connection among the informal leaders
of practice sites (liangong dian), guidance stations (fudao zhan), branch
stations (fenzhan) and main stations (zongzhan). Before the crackdown,
each city or town had a number of practice sites for the convenience of
the practitioners. A group of practice sites constituted a guidance station,
several guidance stations made up a branch station, and several branch
stations made up a main station at city or provincial level. Leaders of the
practice sites and guidance stations were called counsellors (fudao yuan),
and leaders of the branch stations and main stations were called the
station head (zhan zhang). Most counsellors were either self-appointed or
asked by local practitioners to volunteer. On the other hand, both the
station heads in Hong Kong and Chicago were delegated by the charis-
matic leader.31
28. Information on the characteristics and commitment of the membership is both from
my field observation and from three followers who came to Chicago from Beijing and
Guangzhou after the crackdown.
29. James Tong noted these two opposing versions of the FLG organization. See Tong,
“An organizational analysis,” pp. 637–38.
30. Ibid. pp. 641–42.
31. From my field observation and interviews.
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The world-wide FLG main stations were all horizontally linked to each
other through the official falun dafa website, which was also used by the
charismatic leader to convey messages and instructions to followers.
Another horizontal organization was the interpersonal networks of the
FLG practitioners. The number of practitioners in a practice site in China
ranged from 30 to more than 100. Practitioners within a site did not
necessarily know each other and rarely interacted with practitioners from
another site.32 However, as most joined the FLG through their personal
connections, they had pre-existing social relations. Such relations are
close and in small discrete groups.
The organization of the FLG, however, was informal and quite loose
after its switch in 1997. It did not have any staff or distinct administrative
body. Practitioners paid no fees for joining the group and the practices.
Anyone could attend the practice sites in public parks to learn the
meditation and qigong exercises. No personal information needed to be
disclosed. There was no formal or obvious informal enforcement to
staying with the group.33
The FLG as a cult-like NRM. The characteristics of the FLG, to a large
extent, meet the criteria of a NRM. It was formed in a period of dramatic
social, economic and cultural change in China. Its followers are all new
converts and most are without any previous religious experiences. The
FLG is “religious” as it holds a sacred worldview with supernatural
beliefs. It is also a “movement,” with its enthusiasm and efforts to
re-establish moral ethics and normative guidance for its followers. Col-
lective changes are observable in followers’ moral standards, emotional
states, behavioural ethos and physical health.34 Under the rubric of
NRMs, is the FLG a sect, a cult or neither?
My empirical findings show that the FLG is categorically not a sect nor
is it precisely a cult. However, its organization and relation to society, as
well as part of its belief content, have marked resemblance to those of a
cult in a sociological definition.
The FLG was founded by a charismatic leader whose authority is
absolute. The charismatic leader has created a set of sacred texts that are
distinct from that of the traditional world religions. Although FLG
followers are connected through both vertical and horizontal networks,
organization at the levels of ordinary followers and periphery practi-
32. From my field observation and according to the FLG followers who came to Chicago
and went to Hong Kong from China.
33. Information is derived from my observation in Chicago and in Hong Kong as well as
my interviews with the non-FLG Chinese who had some acquaintance with the FLG in China.
For some irregularities and regional variations of the FLG structure in China, see Tong, “An
organizational analysis,” pp. 642–46.
34. For more details about how FLG ideology affects the thoughts and behaviour of
followers, see Cheris Shun-ching Chan, “ ‘We have to clear away the cloud’: ideological
commitment, collective discourses, and movement mobilization of the Falun Gong,” paper
presented at the 96th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association in August
2001 in Anaheim, California.
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tioners is loose and dispersed. The periphery practitioners make up the
majority and their membership fluctuates widely. The founder claimed
that the world-wide number of FLG practitioners was 100 million.35 The
Chinese authorities estimated that China had at least 2 to 3 million FLG
practitioners but the number could possibly be up to 40 million.36 The
actual number is in dispute, and probably not even known by the
charismatic leader. Despite its speedy growth, the FLG did not attempt to
replace other established religions, nor did it require the followers to
relinquish their secular life. FLG followers keep their worldly jobs, live
with their families and interact with non-FLG people in their daily life.
Thus, the FLG is cult-like in terms of its structure and relation to society.
Nevertheless, the FLG is not a cult per se. Although it does not have
prior ties with any religious organizations and it holds some unorthodox
philosophies, it has borrowed some religious content and moral maxims
from Buddhist and Confucian teachings. In this sense, it is comparable to
a sect. Thus, the FLG in the Chinese context at best can be categorized
as a NRM with cult-like characteristics. Owing to the different sociolog-
ical connotations of a sect and a cult, mislabelling the group is undesir-
able for understanding its socio-cultural implications.
The Socio-Cultural Context in China and the Rise of the Falun Gong
Two of the sociological explanations for the emergence of NRMs in
the Euro-American context are useful for understanding the case in
China. The normative breakdown theory argues that modernity has
created a “normative dislocation” and “moral disturbance” under which
new ideological forms are likely to emerge. NRMs are seen as “meaning
seeking” and “moral re-establishing” movements.37 Another explanation
attributes them to the unresolved problems of malfunctioning con-
sumerism, inflation, break-up of breadwinner families, fear of crime and
feeling of isolation. Losing faith in political and economic institutions in
removing the problems, people direct their commitment to religious
bodies for spiritual salvation.38
In China, the practices of qigong grew rapidly from the second half of
the 1980s. In the early 1990s, the number of qigong groups, both
registered and non-registered, reached about 2,000 and a “qigong fever”
phenomenon was evident.39 Qigong is not new to Chinese society.
Nevertheless, a common characteristic among the qigong groups that
emerged in the last two decades is their religious or spiritual undertones.
35. “Falun fofa” (“Falun Buddhist method”), Ming Pao [Ming bao], 11 May 1999.
36. Zhang and Qiao, Comments on and the Biography of Li Hongzhi, p. 132.
37. Robert Bellah, “New religious consciousness and the crisis in modernity,” in Charles
Glock and Robert Bellah (eds.), The New Religious Consciousness (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1976), pp. 333–352.
38. Marvin Harris, America Now: The Anthropology of a Changing Culture (New York:
Touchstone, 1981), pp. 141–165.
39. Zhang and Qiao, Comments on and the Biography of Li Hongzhi, p. 79; see also Ownby,
“ ‘Heterodoxy.’ ”
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Most are cult-like in their structure and practices. The popularity of the
religious and quasi-religious qigong has formed a subculture of occult
and spiritualism. The FLG emerged in 1992, as part and parcel of the
“qigong fever” phenomenon. How can the rise and popularity of the
religious and quasi-religious qigong movements in China be explained?
The discussion below focuses on the FLG but its relevance is not limited
to this case.
Unresolved secular problems. Deng Xiaoping’s daring and large-scale
economic reforms brought about impressive economic growth. This,
however, escalated unresolved social problems. Unemployment rates
multiplied with the collapse of the state industries. The proportion of
people falling below the poverty line decreased only slightly.40 At the
same time, the distribution of income has been increasingly unequal
between urban and rural areas and among different social groups within
the urban population. The Gini coefficient of urban income inequality
rose considerably after 1984. In 1990, it stood at 0.180, almost back to
the pre-reform level.41
Increasing income inequality is accompanied by a nation-wide shrink-
ing of welfare. Especially marked is the commercialization of medical
care, which had been provided practically free under the socialist system.
One FLG representative explained to Zhu Rongji why they joined the
FLG:
Our work units no longer reimburse us for the payments we make for medical
treatment and medicines, whereas Falungong can strengthen our physiques and
improve our health.42
In her study of urban spaces in China, Nancy Chen finds that many urban
dwellers were pulled to qigong practices as a communal alternative to the
trend of intensified individual consumption and unequal access to health
care.43
My findings partly agree with Nancy Chen’s observation. Many of the
periphery practitioners joined the FLG simply for the qigong exercises
and for improving their health.44 One of the reasons for FLG’s unpre-
cedented growth within a short time was that qigong classes were initially
at a modest charge and later free: in 1993, only 10 to 50 yuan (approxi-
mately US$1.2 to 6) while other qigong groups charged 100 to 200 yuan
40. Lucian Pye, “An overview of 50 years of the People’s Republic of China: some
progress, but big problems remain,” The China Quarterly, No. 159 (September 1999).
41. The Gini coefficient is used for measuring income inequality. The index ranges
between zero and one. The higher the index, the higher the inequality of income distribution.
See Chai, “Consumption and living standards,” pp. 737–740.
42. Zong Hairen, “Handling the falungong case,” p.64.
43. Nancy Chen, “Health, wealth, and the good life,” in Nancy Chen et al. (eds.), China
Urban (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 165–182.
44. To be fair, the Chinese have longed been aware of keeping themselves healthy through
qigong exercises. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the medical reform has plunged
people into various qigong practices. Nevertheless, the FLG reached its peak in 1998–99 when
the State Council started to launch a nation-wide health insurance reform.
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(US$12 to 24).45 Even some of the core followers admitted that they first
joined the FLG simply because it might improve their health and was free
of charge.
Normative breakdown. A devoted FLG follower who had joined other
quasi-religious qigong groups before explained why the FLG is most
appealing to her and able to keep up her faith:
Other qigong I joined before also taught us the importance of de (virtue). However,
they didn’t set a high standard for us to follow, nor did they make a real moral
demand on our daily behaviour. The FLG is different. It places the xinxing as the
highest priority in life…. It requires us to follow the principle of zhen–shan–ren in
our daily life.
Almost all the core followers I interviewed, notwithstanding the variation
of their initial motives for joining the FLG, state that it was its moral
teachings that make it superior to other qigong groups, in the context of
a perceived decline of morality in China. In the words of a committed
young follower from Beijing:
Lying, cheating, stealing, bribery, gambling, sex, divorce, fighting, kidnapping,
murdering … anything immoral and criminal you can think of are all happening in
China. Whatever you can think of that is opposite to the Confucian teachings can be
seen in China. If someone is lying on the street desperately asking for help, the
onlookers would ask, “How much would you pay me to help you?”
The FLG selectively restates some of the virtues of the Buddhist and
Confucian ethics and underscores the importance of truthfulness, benevo-
lence and forbearance. The charismatic leader strongly condemns the loss
of moral standards in the Zhuan falun:
The human moral standard is declining tremendously, and the human moral values
are deteriorating daily. People only seek after interest and will harm others for a tiny
bit of personal interest. They compete and struggle against each other by resorting to
all means. Please think about it? Will this be allowed to continue?46
The normative values of honesty, kindness and endurance have long
been part of Confucian teachings. As Raymond Williams observes, when
the dominant culture under-values or opposes the meanings and values
which were created in the past but still have some significance in the
present human experience, there is a “reaching back” to those meanings
and values.47 A restatement of various moral standards and normative
rules is apparently a reaching back to part of the traditional Chinese
values that are under-recognized in contemporary social milieus. The
45. Information is cited from a TV programme “Falun gong daqidi” (“Revealing the reality
of the falun gong”) broadcast by the Fenghuang tai (Phoenix Channel) in China on 25–26 July
1999. This programme was part of the governmental propaganda against the FLG. Its content,
nevertheless, was relatively objective and informative.
46. Quote directly from the English version of the Zhuan falun, p. 15.
47. Raymond Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture (London: Verso, 1980), p.
42.
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FLG is appealing to many people who find the current social order
anomic.48
Ideological vacuum. Although China still maintains a socialist political
system and upholds some communist slogans, its economic and social
orders, in effect, are capitalist. Radical marketization and commercializa-
tion have pushed the ideology of communism out of relevance to
everyday life. The ideological vacuum left by the downfall of commu-
nism began to surface in the second half of the 1980s. The aftermath of
the 4 June 1989 incident further shattered any idealistic ideology.
When communism was still an ideology for the Chinese, it served the
same functions as religions do by providing meaning and hope for
everyday life. With the collapse of such an ideology, people began
seeking answers from pure science or religion. Science signifies
modernity; whereas religion signifies superstition and backwardness. This
is one of the reasons why the FLG refuses to identify itself as a religion.
Nevertheless, most of its followers are drawn to it because of its spiritual
aspirations and its ultimate answers to the meaning of life.
A young follower, a PhD student of chemistry, is pleased that he has
found the ultimate answer to human life from the FLG:
The more you know about science, the more you know about its limitations in giving
us answers. Where do human beings come from? Where do human beings go? What
is the meaning of life? What is the goal of my life? Science cannot give you the
answers. But the falun gong can.
This corresponds with Max Weber’s hypothesis that a disenchantment of
the world would eventually be followed by a re-enchantment when
scientism fails to provide an ultimate answer for the meaning of life.49
With the suppression of religious freedom under communist rule for 50
years, it is not surprising to see hunger for religious or spiritual experi-
ence once the communist ideaology began fading away. The FLG and
other quasi-religious groups offer a sort of ecstatic religious and spiritual
experience for the meaning-seekers in China.
The Crackdown on the Falun Gong: Whose Fault?
In spite of the meteoric rise of the FLG, the CCP’s heavy-handed
crackdown sent it into decline in China, at least for the time being.
Although individual and small group resistant actions were seen in
Beijing throughout the year after the crackdown, the FLG has failed to
obtain the political goals it set for mass petitions.
Rodney Stark theorizes “a model of success” for NRMs. A NRM is
likely to succeed if it fulfils the following eight criteria: retaining
48. For a classical sociological theory of anomie, see Emile Durkheim, “Anomic suicide,”
in Suicide: A Study in Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 241–276. See also
Robert Merton, “Social structure and anomie,” in Social Theory and Social Structure (New
York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 185–214.
49. Max Weber, “Science as a vocation,” in H.H.Gerth and C. Wright Mills (tr. and eds.),
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Galaxy, 1958), pp. 129–156.
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cultural continuity with the conventional faiths of the society in which it
appears or originates; maintaining a medium level of tension with its
surrounding environment; achieving effective mobilization with strong
governance and a high level of individual commitment; attracting and
maintaining a normal age and sex structure; occurring within a favourable
ecology which exists as a relatively unregulated religious economy and
weakened conventional faiths; maintaining dense internal network rela-
tions; resisting secularization; and socializing the young.50 Of these, only
the fifth (occurring within a favourable ecology) is an exogenous factor
with all the others endogenous. The FLG has fulfilled almost all of the
endogenous criteria, especially the first three. For the first two, the FLG
retains continuity with the Confucian teachings on the one hand and
makes some compromise with the commercialized culture on the other.
While the FLG devaluates the increasingly materialistic culture, it never
requires its followers to leave their ordinary social and economic lives. Its
denial of modern medication, nevertheless, does put it in tension with its
surrounding environment to a certain degree. For the third criterion, the
mass sit-in in Zhongnanhai reveals the mobilization power of the FLG.
The subsequent resistant actions and defiant struggles show the level of
commitment of the core followers. For the only exogenous factor in
Stark’s model, it has been shown earlier that the socio-cultural environ-
ment in China in the early 1990s was favourable for cult-like religions to
emerge. When the FLG is situated in Stark’s model, the only obvious
unfavourable ecological condition is the highly regulated religious econ-
omy in China. Nevertheless, it is unconvincing to suggest that it is simply
the lack of religious freedom in China that led to the severe crackdown
against it.
A more plausible cause for the CCP’s suppression of the FLG is its
perception of the movement as a threat to its rule. Its perception is shaped
by the interaction among the characteristics of the FLG, the actions of the
FLG followers, and the historical and political matrix in China.
The political implication of NRMs in Chinese history and the religious
nature of the FLG. In Chinese history, anti-government rebellions almost
always took the form of NRMs. For example, the fearsome rebellion of
the Yellow Turbans in the Han Dynasty in 184 took the central authorities
eleven months to suppress and resulted in 30-year internal wars and
conflicts. Toward the end of the Yuan Dynasty, the White Lotus Sect
revolted against the emperor and seized part of the empire. The sect
revived in the 18th to the 19th century during the Qing Dynasty and
caused turbulence in the empire. The semi-Christian Kingdom of
Heavenly Peace in the middle of the Qing Dynasty was threatening to the
state and led to 20 million deaths.51 The analysis above shows that the
50. Rodney Stark, “How religions succeed: a theoretical model,” in The Future of New
Religious Movements, p. 13.
51. Chun-ken Lui and Wing So, Zhongguo shijie lun: zongjiao fazhan pian (Chinese
History Analysis: The Development of Religions) (Hong Kong: Dan Ching Publishers, 1998).
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FLG is not a sect in its organization and would be unlikely to be as
socially dangerous as any of the past religious movements. Nevertheless,
it has its own ideology and organizational strengths. Its ability to mobilize
thousands of protesters without the CCP knowing made it appear to be
politically dangerous and comparable to other NRMs in the past.
The extremely orderly and disciplined manners of FLG petitioners
outside the CCP leaders’ residence on 25 April 1999 shocked the leaders.
The petitioners did not hold placards or shout slogans, nor did they
obstruct or occupy any part of the street. They stood close to one another
in three or four rows along the street to maintain order and prevent
outsiders from inserting themselves. Men in the foremost row faced the
street. Those behind sat on the ground, some resting, others reading the
Zhuan falun. If they were approached by journalists they generally
refrained from giving any replies. After eating, they wrapped the rubbish
in plastic bags and took them away when they left. They did not leave a
single scrap of paper or a cigarette butt.52 The FLG followers appeared to
the CCP leaders to be “extraordinary.” The leaders soon realized that this
disciplined and orderly demeanour was associated with the religious or
quasi-religious nature of the organization. One of the Party leaders called
for immediate action to investigate the FLG because:
We are now at a sensitive point in time, and similar incidents may very well produce
certain mental associations in people’s minds. We must pay close attention to various
tendencies in society and nip the problem in the bud. Comrades, we must not, under
any circumstances, underestimate the appeal of Falungong, an organization with a
religious patina.53
Throughout Chinese history, secret societies and quasi-religious organiza-
tions prospered whenever society experienced too much dramatic change
or rulers failed to soothe mass grievances. In late 1990s China, rising
unemployment and income inequality were coupled with the risk of the
CCP losing legitimacy. It did not require too much imagination to
perceive the FLG as a threatening religious movement that could disrupt,
if not revolt against, the CCP’s rule.
The authorities depicted the fight against the FLG as a “serious
ideological and political struggle.”54 Li Hongzhi was said to have con-
spicuous political ambitions and instigated people to oppose the govern-
ment:
Li Hongzhi’s ulterior motive is to grab the ideological commanding heights from the
Communist Party. He fabricated a whole set of absurd ideas, and made people believe
52. According to Zong Hairen, “Handling the falungong case” and various media reports.
For example, see “10,000 protesters in Beijing urge cult’s recognition,” The New York Times,
26 April 1999) and “Followers line streets near Party headquarters in biggest demonstration
since 1989,” South China Morning Post, 26 April 1999.
53. Zong Hairen, “Handling the falungong case,” p. 63.
54. “Getting a thorough grasp of the political nature of falun gong,” a commentary article
published by New China News Agency in Beijing, China Daily, 1 August 1999. See also “Li
Hongzhi, a cult leader with evil political ambition,” China Daily, 4 August 1999, and “More
people clear on true nature of falun gong,” China Daily. 15 August 1999).
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that his words were the only absolute truth in the world. His remarks on Heaven and
God … plainly reveal his aim of overthrowing materialism and the Communist
Party.55
The State Planning Committee characterized the fight against the FLG
as “an extremely complicated, life-or-death political struggle.”56 The
political agenda and the power of the FLG seem to be overstated by the
CCP. However, they had grounds for this. The FLG appeared to be
threatening to the rule of the CCP not only because of its religiously
tinged attributes but also due to its efficiency in mobilizing mass action
and its unique organization.
The canon of social stability and the mobilization power of the FLG.
The CCP has been particularly sensitive about mass movement and
collective action since the 1989 pro-democracy student movement. The
political leaders might have different suggestions of how to handle the
FLG mass sit-in, but they all agree that maintaining social stability is the
highest interest of the country.57
FLG petitioners’ effort to present a good image by being sober and
disciplined in the mass sit-in turned out to be a fearful sign for the CCP.
It showed how powerful the FLG could be in organizing mass action and
disciplining the participants. In addition, the FLG had staged over ten
petitions to different mass media organizations to protest against their
distorted reports about the group before the one it did in Zhongnanhai. A
CCP leader noted that the Zhongnanhai sit-in “is the most serious
political incident since the ‘June 4’ political disturbance in 1989.”58
The high mobilization power of the FLG is related to its followers’
strong ideological commitment and its organizational structure. The
ideological commitment of the core followers to their charismatic leader
in a sense resembles the ideological commitment of the masses to Mao in
the 1950s to the early 1970s. The resilience and self-discipline traits of
the followers shown in various mass petitions all seem fearsome to the
CCP leaders. In accusing the FLG of having a substantial political
background, one of the CCP leaders made the following comments:
Think back to April 25 ten years ago, when the Central Television Station broadcast
the People’s Daily editorial on taking a clear-cut stand against bourgeois liberalism.
Isn’t it quite clear why they (FLG followers) have illegally converged on Zhongnan-
hai on the same day ten years later, at such a sensitive moment?59
Late April is indeed a sensitive moment as it also commemorates the
55. “Li Hongzhi’s political motives and serious mischief: commentary,” China Daily, 11
August 1999).
56. “ ‘Si Erwu’ shijian zhenxiang gongbu gejie fanying qianglie: guangda ganbu qunzhong
qiedi renqing falun gong xian’e zhengzhi yongxin” (“Strong reactions to the real picture of
the ‘April 25’ incident: the officials and the public should know about the evil political motive
of the falun gong”), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 16 August 1999.
57. Zong Hairen, “Handling the falungong case,” pp. 57 and 65, citing Zhu Rongji and Hu
Jintao’s emphasis on social stability.
58. Ibid. p. 66.
59. Ibid. p. 63.
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student demonstration in Beijing on 27 April 1989 to pay tribute to Hu
Yaobang’s death.
It should be noted that a series of reactions between the FLG and the
CCP before the crackdown have made the FLG more political and the
CCP more legitimated to clamp down on the group. Following the 25
April petition to Zhongnanhai, news of the collective demonstrations and
petitions of FLG followers was reported all over the country.60 And
arrests of some of the FLG key members happened before the official ban
on 22 July.61 On 26 June 1999, I attended a FLG international sharing
conference in Chicago and observed that some core followers were
discussing what the FLG could do in the face of the Chinese authorities’
detention of their fellows. Some followers suggested that they could
preach the FLG teachings to those in politics in the United States. They
believed that if more and more American city mayors gave official
recognition to Li Hongzhi, the FLG would become more legitimate and
people would tend to disbelieve the CCP’s accusations. After the incident
of 25 April and the CCP’s strong criticism of the group afterwards, the
FLG gave up their previous apolitical stance to defend their legitimation
and to gain international sympathy and support. Li Hongzhi became a star
for various news media.62 Overseas FLG followers’ strategic move
towards American politics and Li’s exaggerated spotlighting of the
group’s global scale and influence certainly further embarrassed the CCP
and reinforced its belief that the FLG was politically hazardous.
The organization of the FLG and the charismatic leader’s overseas
support. Before the crackdown, the FLG had 39 main stations, 1,900
guidance stations and 28,000 practices sites spread over China.63 The
vertical point-to-point connection, together with a tightly knit cyber
network and a dispersed interpersonal network, gave the FLG a unique,
efficient internal organization which both facilitated its mass mobilization
and made it difficult for the CCP to put it under surveillance. The Party
leaders know how to deal with conventional organizations. But how
could they deal with an invisible organization that has high mobilization
power and an efficient internal network? Accordingly, Jiang Zemin was
startled and angered when the Ministry of Public Security overlooked the
FLG organization.64
The CCP was also alarmed by the involvement of numerous Party
members and high officials in the FLG. According to Zong, 15.6 per cent
of the officially announced 2.3 million FLG followers were Party mem-
bers.65 Furthermore, functionaries of state organs, military people, armed
police, medical practitioners, teachers and even diplomats were also
60. Ibid. p. 67.
61. Ibid. p. 69.
62. “Falun Buddhist method”, Ming Pao, 11 May 1999.
63. Wong, “The mystery,” p. 17.
64. Zong Hairen, “Handling the falungong case,” pp. 60–61.
65. Ibid. p. 67.
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found in the FLG.66 The Party leaders were bewildered when they found
that the five FLG representatives who requested a meeting with Zhu
Rongji on 25 April came from the Ministry of Public Security, the
Ministry of Inspection Supervision, the Ministry of Railways, the Second
Department of the General Staff Headquarters and Beijing University.67
Another irritation to the CCP leadership was the charismatic leader’s
world-wide recognition and overseas support, particularly from North
America. One of the top Party leaders voiced his worry over Li
Hongzhi’s overseas background soon after the 25 April mass sit-in: “The
headquarters of Falungong and of Li Hongzhi are both in the United
States. We must not exclude the possibility of organizations beyond our
borders taking a hand in this matter.”68 A few months later, the CCP
accused the FLG leader of attempting to overthrow the Party and
socialism with foreign backing:
It is a fact that Li Hongzhi used the Falun Gong organization to deliberately create
chaos and undermine the good situation of stability and unity…. By ganging up with
hostile forces abroad and at home, to overthrow the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party and change the socialist system.69
The charismatic leader, together with his family, emigrated to the United
States in 1998. Since then, he has intensified his proselytizing activities
overseas. In 1999, FLG main stations can be found in dozens of cities in
North America, Eastern and Western Europe, Australia, South and South-
east Asia.70 As early as 1996, Li received honourable recognition from
Houston, Texas. After FLG’s mass sit-in in Beijing, Li received more
official recognition in the United States. For example, the Mayor of the
City of Chicago declared 25 June 1999 as “Master Li Hong Zhi Day in
Chicago.” Li also received official welcome and recognition letters from
the cities of San Jose, Toronto and Ontario between May and July 1999.71
Thus, it came as no surprise that Li, who was a religious leader with
millions of followers in China and had gained some sort of political
support from North America, was perceived by the CCP as threatening to
its rule.
Conclusion
From a sociological perspective, the FLG is neither a sect nor a cult per
se. It is, however, a NRM with cult-like characteristics. These are
evidenced by its organizational structure, its relation to society and part
of its belief content. The FLG emerged at a time when the economic
system, social conditions and cultural values in China were undergoing
66. Ibid. p. 62.
67. Ibid. p. 55.
68. Ibid. p. 63.
69. “Fight falun gong to ensure stability,” China Daily, 16 August 1999.
70. Information obtained from falun dafa official website.
71. Information obtained from my field observation of the Experience Sharing Conference
in Chicago on 26 June 1999. It is also posted on the falun dafa website.
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drastic changes. These changes provided a favourable ecological con-
dition for the FLG and other religious and quasi-religious movements to
emerge and expand in the last two decades in China. The FLG and other
similar groups emerged as a response to unresolved secular problems, a
normative breakdown and an ideological vacuum in China.
The majority of the FLG practitioners were initially drawn to the FLG,
as to other quasi-religious qigong groups, for health improvement. How-
ever, some people found the FLG different from the others because it
provided them with a set of moral standards and guidance; others found
it capable of explaining unexplained human puzzles, particularly the
meaning of life and the mysteries of the universe.
The FLG as a NRM itself is successful. It fulfils most of the criteria for
success in Stark’s model. It has a layer of ideologically committed core
followers, a well-connected internal network, high mobilization capacity,
effective organizational power and overseas support. It could have
achieved its political goals if it operated in a different historical and
political context. Nevertheless, the FLG began to decline in China after
it demonstrated to the state authorities its mobilization and organizational
power. The crackdown on the FLG cannot be attributed to either exoge-
nous or endogenous factors alone. What is critical is the interplay
between these two sets of factors. The Chinese history of religious
movements and the political signification of mass movements have set up
a peculiar context in which the more successful and large-scale a move-
ment is, the more likely it is to face suppression. This is especially so
when a movement is religious in nature with high mobilization power and
invisible, well-connected networking.
The FLG is one of the many religious and quasi-religious qigong
movements that arose in China during a period of rapid economic and
social changes. My findings on the popularity of the FLG accord with
various sociological explanations for the emergence of the NRMs in
Euro-American contexts. Nevertheless, the case of the FLG also shows
the inadequacy of applying Euro-American sociological theories squarely
to non-Euro-American contexts. The concepts of sect and cult, for
example, developed out of a specific Judeo-Christian historical and
socio-cultural context. Similarly, an exemplary theory of successful
NRMs in the United States cannot be applied unreservedly in a Chinese
context without taking its political and historical factors into consider-
ation. This may hold true when we apply any other social science theories
developed in the West to the case of China.
